It's worth separating the questions of whether a pattern could possibly function well in good times and whether it is robustly designed to function well in all times.
If the quality of the data of our research institutions is vulnerable in periods of higher partisanship, then that's a real weak spot. If, as you suggest, the executive and/or legislative branch is susceptible to occasional ideological capture, that's another.
Mini-publics, being representative of the public, aren't partisanship-proof, but they're at least partisanship-resistant. Same with ideology.
I don't think agency power implies authoritarianism by any stretch, but it does imply vulnerability to authoritarianism. It's not a driving force, but nor is it the bulwark it could be.
Fwiw, I don't think I took Sasse's word; I rejected the core of his argument. But I thought it was an interesting starting point, because it's the last time I remember anyone bringing significant attention to the delegation of legislative authority in a way that had any broad public resonance.
You're definitely right that Congress can and does occasionally respond to things when there is enough heat, but to me that's only further damns the model. It puts the onus on the public to form a movement just to get a hearing. Public comment is fine, but that's not the same as deliberation.
I feel like the claim that "all federal laws should get deliberative attention" is only controversial because we've designed ourselves into a corner where it's impossible to achieve. So let's design our way back out of it :)
It's worth separating the questions of whether a pattern could possibly function well in good times and whether it is robustly designed to function well in all times.
If the quality of the data of our research institutions is vulnerable in periods of higher partisanship, then that's a real weak spot. If, as you suggest, the executive and/or legislative branch is susceptible to occasional ideological capture, that's another.
Mini-publics, being representative of the public, aren't partisanship-proof, but they're at least partisanship-resistant. Same with ideology.
I don't think agency power implies authoritarianism by any stretch, but it does imply vulnerability to authoritarianism. It's not a driving force, but nor is it the bulwark it could be.
Fwiw, I don't think I took Sasse's word; I rejected the core of his argument. But I thought it was an interesting starting point, because it's the last time I remember anyone bringing significant attention to the delegation of legislative authority in a way that had any broad public resonance.
You're definitely right that Congress can and does occasionally respond to things when there is enough heat, but to me that's only further damns the model. It puts the onus on the public to form a movement just to get a hearing. Public comment is fine, but that's not the same as deliberation.
I feel like the claim that "all federal laws should get deliberative attention" is only controversial because we've designed ourselves into a corner where it's impossible to achieve. So let's design our way back out of it :)