On Decisions
On Decisions
This week I read a piece by Heinz von Förster, an Austrian cyberneticist. The piece is on ethics and second-order cybernetics (you know, the stuff one reads before breakfast). This quote stuck with me:
Only those questions that are in principle undecidable, we can decide. (von Förster 2003, 5)
This reminded me of another piece I read a couple of months ago by Zhen Goh of Cognitive Edge (Aporetic Meditations) who identified that also Jacques Derrida apparently was of the opinion, that in order for something to qualify as a “decision”, it is defined by the fact that it was “undecidable”. (I’m not sure in how far von Förster and Derrida knew each other or were inspired by each other, to be honest.)
Derrida, in turn, draws from Kierkegaard, who according to Derrida said:
The moment of decision as such… must always remain a finite moment of urgency and precipitation; it must not be the consequence or the effect of theoretical or historical knowledge, reflection or deliberation, since the decision always marks the interruption of the juridico-, ethico-, or politico-cognitive deliberation that precedes it, that must precede it. The instant of a decision is a madness. (‘Dialanguages’ in Points: Interviews 1974–1994, 147–8.)
Why is this so important? Well, it somehow exposes the whole current culture on ‘evidence-based decision-making’ as a logical fallacy. If a decision is evidence-based, meaning there is knowledge that tells us what to do, then it’s not a decision. It seems that politicians are afraid to make real decisions. They always seem to want to hide behind evidence as to say that they did not really have a choice. But what else does that say then that they did not really have to decide? Yet in many cases, evidence is not conclusive. So they still have to decide. A real theatre! Von Förster puts it this way:
With much ingenuity and imagination, mechanisms have been contrived by which one could bypass this awesome burden [to have the real freedom to decide something]. Through hierarchies, entire institutions have been built where it is impossible to localize responsibility. Everyone in such a system can say, “I was told to do ’X.’” On the political stage, we hear more and more the phrase of Pontius Pilate, “I have no choice but ’X.’” In other words, “Don’t hold me responsible for ’X.’ Blame someone else.” This phrase apparently replaces, “Among the many choices I had, I decided on ’X.’” (von Förster 2003, 5)
Among the many choices I had, I decided on ‘X’. In a way this links back to my point last week on whether Purpose is a Red Herring: purpose is not about the big shiny destination but about deciding what the right thing is in the moment. Many of these decisions will be undecidable and, hence, real decisions.
It is quite interesting to observe myself struggling with decisions. I am not a very good decision-maker, I also try to find ways not to make decisions by somehow trying to find a way to make the choice objective. Criteria that are weight and added up and long lists to compare different options. But in a way it also feels liberating that some decisions are in principle not decidable. And that we have real choice. That also links to agency. Only when a decision is undecidable, we have real agency in making a decision.
What are the decisions you need to make or have been making knowing that there is no right answer? How does this make you feel? Does knowing that there is no right answer make it easier or harder? Get in touch by simply replying to this email and let me know what you think.
The Paper Museum
The extract in my Paper Museum is also from the speech by Heinz von Förster on second-order cybernetics and ethics quoted above, in which he describes the relation between cybernetics and ethics.
Ladies and Gentlemen, this perception represents a fundamental change, not only in the way we conduct science, but also how we perceive teaching, learning, the therapeutic process, organizational management, and so on and so forth; and I would say, of how we perceive relationships in our daily life. One may see this fundamental epistemological change if one first considers oneself to be an independent observer who watches the world go by; as opposed to a person who considers oneself to be a participant actor in the drama of mutual interaction of the give and take in the circularity of human relations.
In the case of the first example, as a result of my independence, I can tell others how to think and act, “Thou shalt . . . ” “Thou shalt not . . . ” This is the origin of moral codes. In the case of the second example, because of my interdependence, I can only tell myself how to think and act, “I shall . . . ” “I shall not . . . ” This is the origin of ethics.
This was the easy part of my presentation. Now comes the difficult part. I am supposed to talk about ethics. How to go about this? Where to begin?
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The thorns I begin with are Ludwig Wittgenstein’s reflections upon ethics in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
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In his famous point Number 6.421 he comes to a conclusion which I will read to you in the original German, “Es ist Klar, dass sich Ethik nicht aussprechen lässt.” I wish I knew a French translation. I only know two English translations which are both incorrect. Therefore, I will present _my translation into English, with my conviction that the simultaneous translators will do a superb job of presenting Wittgenstein’s point in French. Here is my English version of 6.421, “It is clear that ethics cannot be articulated.”_
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Let me continue with Wittgenstein, “It is clear however, that ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the usual sense of the terms. Nevertheless, there must indeed be some kind of ethical reward and punishment, but they must reside in the action itself.”
They must reside in the action itself! You may remember, we came across such self-referential notions earlier with the example, “A implies A” and its recursive relatives of second-order cybernetics. Can we take a hint from these comments for how to go about reflecting about ethics, and at the same time adhere to Wittgenstein’s criterion? I think we can. I myself try to adhere to the following rule; to master the use of my language so that ethics is implicit in any discourse I may have. (e.g., in science, philosophy, epistemology, therapy, etc.)
What do I mean by that? By that I mean to let language and action ride on an underground river of ethics, and to make sure that one is not thrown off. This insures that ethics does not become explicit and that language does not degenerate into moralizations. (von Förster 2003, 2-3)
Why did I add this extract to my Paper Museum? I somehow feel sympathetic with the notion that ethics cannot be articulated, that it is something that emerges from continuous interactions and is continuously renegotiated. That does not mean that it is erratic as human interactions generally take up habitual form quite quickly. Yet the moment ethical principles are written down, they somehow lose the contact with reality – they can be used and misused as they are no longer part of a relationship.
Reference
von Foerster, H. 2003. “Ethics and Second-Order Cybernetics.” In_Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition_, edited by Heinz von Foerster, 287–304. New York, NY: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-21722-3_14.