Today I filed an amicus brief in the Michigan Supreme Court in Michigan Senate v. Michigan House of Representatives. The case involves nine bills that passed both houses of the Michigan Legislature at the end of the 2024 session but were never sent to Governor Whitmer.

What happened is simple—and extraordinary. By the end of December 2024, the House and Senate had passed each of the nine bills by majority vote in each chamber. The next stop was the Governor’s desk. But the House, inexplicably, did not send the measures to the Governor. When Republicans took control of the House in January 2025, Speaker Matt Hall continued to hold the bills. He refused to send them to Governor Whitmer for signature or veto.

These were not merely technical measures. They included bills that “would place correction officers in the state police pension system, require governments to pay a larger share of employee health care premiums, exempt public assistance from debt collection and allow Detroit historical museums to propose a millage.” These measures would protect teachers from crushing health-care costs, protect families from abusive debt collection, and provide essential revenue for the Charles H. Wright Museum of African American History, among other things.

Last October, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the House’s refusal violated the Michigan Constitution. In a published 2-1 opinion, the court concluded that Article 4, Section 33—which says that “[e]very bill passed by the legislature shall be presented to the governor before it becomes law”—imposes a mandatory duty of presentment. The court also held that the Court of Claims should issue a writ of mandamus requiring the House to present the nine bills to the Governor so she could sign or veto them.

My brief supports the Senate’s position and argues that the Supreme Court should affirm the Court of Appeals. It focuses on a basic constitutional point: the Michigan Constitution gives lawmaking power to the Legislature as a body—not to a single legislative leader. When a bill has received majority votes in both houses, an individual Speaker does not get to prevent the Governor from ever seeing it.

The House’s contrary argument would create a legislative pocket veto. But the Michigan Constitution gives the pocket veto power to the Governor, not to the Speaker of the House or any other legislative officer. Allowing a Speaker to run out the clock after a bill has passed both houses would let one person nullify the votes of bicameral majorities.

The brief also explains why the end of an even-year legislative session does not erase the constitutional duty to present passed bills. Article 4, Section 33 expressly contemplates that the Governor may act on a bill after the Legislature has “finally adjourned the session at which the bill was passed.”

The Constitution’s text and structure are clear. Bills pass by majority vote in both houses. The Governor then gets to sign or veto them. No individual legislative leader gets an extra, unwritten veto power.