Trump Tells Allies to 'Go Get Your Own Oil' as Iran Missile Rate Collapses

Osomon Consultancy LLC-FZ | Tuesday, 31 March 2026 | 13:37 GMT

Trump posted on Truth Social telling countries unable to get jet fuel because of Hormuz, naming the United Kingdom specifically, to 'buy from the U.S., we have plenty' or 'build up some delayed courage, go to the Strait, and just TAKE IT.' He said the US 'won't be there to help you anymore, just like you weren't there for us,' declared Iran 'essentially, decimated,' and said 'the hard part is done. Go get your own oil' (Truth Social, 31 March). → Off-ramp

Secretary of State Rubio told Al Jazeera in an exclusive interview that US war objectives would be achieved in 'weeks, not months' and that communications with Tehran continue through intermediaries (Al Jazeera). This is the first explicit timeline from the State Department since the conflict began. → Off-ramp

Israel opened a new front in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley on Monday night, targeting what Al Jazeera reported as supply lines between Hezbollah strongholds and the Syrian border. Four IDF soldiers were killed in a single engagement in southern Lebanon, bringing total Israeli military deaths in Lebanon to 10 since 2 March (Al Jazeera, citing IDF). A Lebanese army soldier was killed and five wounded in a direct Israeli strike on an army checkpoint (CNN, citing Lebanese army statement). → Wider war

Iranian missile fire on Israel has slowed to 10 to 15 missiles per day, usually one to three per salvo, down from approximately 90 on Day 1 (Times of Israel, Haaretz). The IDF said it struck 170 Iranian targets in the past 24 hours (CBS News, citing IDF statement). → Quagmire

The IRGC confirmed the death of Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri, its naval commander, in an Israeli strike in Bandar Abbas (Al Jazeera, citing IRGC). Tangsiri's killing was reported on 27 March; the IRGC had not previously acknowledged the cause. → Wider war

Iran's parliamentary security committee approved a toll regime for vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz, with full passage and Guardian Council review still pending (Al Jazeera, citing state media). This codifies into draft legislation the selective blockade framework the IRGC established by military decree on 27 March. → Wider war

NATO forces intercepted a missile fired from Iran toward Turkey, the fourth such intercept since the war began (Al Jazeera). → Wider war

Fed Chair Powell said at Harvard on 30 March that policy is 'in a good place' and the Fed would 'look through' a supply-driven oil shock rather than tighten (CNBC, Harvard Crimson). The US 10-year yield fell 10 basis points to 4.34 per cent on the session.

Iran's foreign ministry spokesperson Baqaei said there have been 'no negotiations with America' over 31 days, only proposals submitted through intermediaries including Pakistan (CBS News). Pakistan's deputy prime minister is in Beijing for talks with Chinese FM Wang Yi, following weekend meetings with Saudi, Turkish and Egyptian officials (Al Jazeera).

The war entered a new phase on Tuesday morning when Trump told countries locked out of Hormuz to 'buy from the U.S., we have plenty' or 'go to the Strait, and just TAKE IT.' He named the United Kingdom specifically, said the US 'won't be there to help you anymore,' declared Iran 'essentially, decimated,' and closed with 'the hard part is done. Go get your own oil.' Read alongside Monday's WSJ report that he is privately willing to end the war without reopening Hormuz, and Vance's statement that military objectives have been accomplished, this is no longer a leak or an interpretation. It is a publicly stated intention to declare victory and hand the Hormuz problem to allies. For the UK, Europe, and Japan, the countries excluded from Iran's approved transit list and now explicitly told by Washington to fend for themselves, this is the worst configuration: the military pressure that might have forced Hormuz open is being withdrawn, but the blockade remains.

'Buy from the U.S.' is not a throwaway line. It reframes permanent Hormuz disruption from a crisis into a commercial opportunity for American energy exports. The US is the world's largest LNG exporter and a net petroleum product exporter. It should be noted that it is not a net crude exporter (despite claims to the contrary by Energy Secretary Chris Wright). A Strait that stays closed to Western-allied shipping while US Gulf Coast terminals operate freely is not a problem for Washington; it is a market-share play. European buyers locked out of Gulf crude and Qatari LNG become captive customers for US exports at prices set by the disruption. This is the economic logic underneath the rhetoric, and it explains why the force posture, despite SEALs, Rangers, Marines, and 82nd Airborne all now in theatre, points toward withdrawal rather than Hormuz reopening.

The war's military trajectory supports the withdrawal thesis. Iran's missile fire on Israel has fallen from roughly 90 launches on Day 1 to 10 to 15 per day, usually in salvos of one to three. That decline is the single most important operational data point this week. It tells you either that Israeli and American strikes have degraded Iranian launch infrastructure faster than it can be reconstituted, or that Tehran is conserving remaining inventory for a negotiating endpoint. Either interpretation favours resolution over indefinite escalation. But the diplomatic track is not converging on the military reality. Israel opened a sixth identifiable theatre on Monday night, launching operations in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. Four IDF soldiers were killed in a single clash in southern Lebanon, and a Lebanese army soldier was killed in a direct Israeli strike on a military checkpoint. NATO intercepted a fourth Iranian missile over Turkish territory. Each of these events has its own escalation logic, and none of them are being addressed by the diplomatic channels currently in play. Rubio's 'weeks, not months' is the most significant timeline statement from the administration, because it comes from the State Department rather than the White House, which means the diplomatic machinery is being calibrated to deliver, not just threaten.

The second-order development that markets have not yet absorbed is Iran's parliamentary security committee approving Hormuz tolls. The selective blockade identified in the 26 March edition was a military decree from the IRGC; it could be lifted by the IRGC. A parliamentary act, once fully passed and ratified by the Guardian Council, would require a parliamentary repeal. Tehran is institutionalising the blockade, converting a wartime measure into a permanent feature of the Strait's legal architecture. Any negotiated reopening of Hormuz must now clear Iran's legislature, not just its military command, which adds weeks to any diplomatic timeline and introduces domestic political vetoes that did not previously exist. For the nations on the approved transit list, the toll formalisation means their vessels face three concurrent cost layers: the Iranian toll itself, war risk premiums of 5 to 10 per cent of hull value, and elevated P&I insurance. Even approved-list tankers transiting Hormuz are carrying $10 to $14 million in additional voyage costs, as Lloyd's List reported. That surcharge erodes the arbitrage between Iranian-sanctioned and market crude, which is precisely the mechanism through which Iran's selective reopening was supposed to fracture the coalition. The Al-Salmi tanker droned at Dubai anchorage overnight, carrying 2 million barrels of Kuwaiti and Saudi crude bound for Qingdao, underscores the point: Iran struck a cargo headed for China, one of the countries on its own approved transit list.

Powell's 'look through' guidance is the macro anchor the market needed. By explicitly ruling out tightening in response to supply-driven oil inflation, the Fed removed the scenario in which the war produces both an energy shock and a monetary tightening, the toxic combination that defined 1973. The 10-basis-point decline in the 10-year yield reflects this: the bond market is now pricing a Fed that holds, not a Fed that hikes. The practical implication is that the dollar's war premium has narrowed to pure haven demand, with no rate support underneath it. If the Pakistan-Beijing track or any other channel produces a credible framework before 6 April, the dollar could give back two to three points on the DXY rapidly. For operators with Gulf exposure, the convergence of legislative toll formalisation, persistent war risk premiums, and VLCC charter rates that have quadrupled since late February to nearly $800,000 per day means the cost of doing business through Hormuz has structurally repriced regardless of how the war ends. Businesses budgeting for a return to pre-war shipping economics after a ceasefire should plan for a 12- to 18-month normalisation, not a snap-back.

Ceasefire, oil drops to $70-80, LNG normalises. Fed cuts resume. EUR rebounds harder than GBP. Dollar weakens. Gold retreats. Equities rally.

Today: Raised from 11 per cent. Trump's 'the hard part is done' and 'go get your own oil' is the most explicit mission-accomplished framing from any US official. Rubio's 'weeks, not months' is the first explicit State Department timeline. Multilateral diplomacy intensifying via Pakistan-Beijing track. The off-ramp probability rises not because a deal is close but because the US is signalling it may simply leave. This leads us to question if a fourth option should be here which is "The Cold Blokade" (see below).

War drags, dollar peaks Q2 then fades on US recession risk. GBP outperforms EUR (BoE can hike, ECB trapped). Oil $90-110, LNG elevated. Gold grinds higher. Equities choppy.

Today: Raised from 41 per cent. Iran's missile rate collapse from 90 per day to 10 to 15 suggests the war is settling into a lower-intensity grind rather than spiralling. A US withdrawal that leaves Hormuz closed and allies to resolve it fits this scenario: the shooting slows but the economic disruption persists indefinitely.

Regional escalation, Hormuz stays closed, $130+ oil, LNG spikes to $20-28. Dollar strong throughout. EUR collapses more than GBP. Gold surges. Equities enter bear market.

Today: Cut from 48 per cent. Despite the new Bekaa Valley front and a fourth Turkish intercept, Iran's collapsing offensive tempo, Brent pulling back from $115, and the accumulation of withdrawal signals from Vance, Rubio, Trump, and the WSJ collectively reduce the probability of further US-driven escalation. The risk now shifts to whether allies attempt a Hormuz operation without US support, which would be escalatory but is not yet being discussed.

A fourth outcome is taking shape that does not fit cleanly into the existing three scenarios: the war ends, but the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb do not reopen to Western-allied shipping. Trump declares victory, withdraws, and leaves Hormuz reopening to NATO and the Gulf states. Iran keeps its selective transit system and parliamentary toll regime. The Houthis maintain their Red Sea posture. The shooting stops but the supply disruption becomes permanent.

This is not a peace scenario in any economic sense. Oil reroutes via the Cape. European and Japanese energy costs stay elevated indefinitely. US Gulf Coast LNG and crude exports capture market share from Gulf producers locked behind the blockade. The energy trading architecture bifurcates along the lines Iran's approved transit list has already drawn: Asian buyers retain access, Western buyers do not. Gold stays bid because the dollar-denominated settlement system has fractured. Equities rally on ceasefire headlines, then reprice downward as the permanence of the disruption becomes clear.

We are not assigning this a probability yet. The force posture in theatre, SEALs, Rangers, two MEUs, and the 82nd Airborne, tells a different story from the withdrawal rhetoric, and Trump is more predictable from what he deploys than what he posts. But the WSJ report, Vance's mission-accomplished framing, Rubio's timeline, and today's 'go get your own oil' are converging on this outcome faster than any of the three existing scenarios anticipated. If the 6 April deadline passes without strikes on energy infrastructure, the Cold Blockade becomes the base case and will be formally integrated into the framework.

USD

DXY eased to 100.3 from Monday's 100.5 as the WSJ de-escalation report triggered modest dollar selling. Powell's 'look through' removes the rate-hike tail risk that was supporting the dollar's war premium. The dollar's strength is now entirely a haven play, not a rate play, making it more vulnerable to any ceasefire signal than it was last week. Trump's 'buy from the U.S.' reframes the dollar's war-premium thesis: if Hormuz disruption benefits US energy exporters, the dollar retains structural support even in a de-escalation that would normally be dollar-negative.

EUR

EUR/USD slipped to 1.147 from 1.152, a modest decline. The EU foreign ministers' statement that the war is 'not Europe's war' is politically understandable but economically irrelevant: European exclusion from the Hormuz approved transit list continues to price into energy costs regardless of diplomatic framing. Trump's post intensifies the pressure: if the US withdraws and leaves Hormuz to allies, Europe must choose between organising a naval escort it has no appetite for or accepting permanently higher energy import costs.

GBP

GBP/USD has fallen to 1.321 from 1.334, the sharpest move in the pair since the war began. The decline reflects broad dollar haven demand, the Al-Salmi tanker attack near Dubai, and the WSJ de-escalation report. Trump's Truth Social post naming the UK as a country that 'refused to get involved in the decapitation of Iran' and telling it to 'go get your own oil' introduces a new category of risk for sterling: explicit US diplomatic hostility toward the UK's energy security posture. Starmer's insistence that Hormuz is not a NATO mission now looks less like prudent distance and more like the positioning that invited Trump's rebuke. If the UK is excluded from any US-led post-war energy architecture, sterling's structural advantage over the euro narrows. The BoE's optionality to hike remains, but the macro picture for the UK has deteriorated in 24 hours.

USD earners in Europe

Powell's 'look through' changes the dollar calculus. The greenback's war premium now rests entirely on haven demand, not rate expectations, making it more fragile in an off-ramp scenario. But Trump's 'buy from the U.S.' introduces a countervailing support: if Hormuz disruption is reframed as a commercial advantage for US energy, the dollar retains a floor even in de-escalation. USD earners should still extend forward cover on EUR payables to six to nine months. Corporate treasurers should stress-test Q2 budgets at EUR/USD 1.10 for Kharg escalation and 1.18 for ceasefire, as flagged yesterday, but now assign higher weight to the upper bound.

EUR earners

The EU 'not Europe's war' posture means no coordinated European naval escort for Hormuz, which means European energy costs remain hostage to the IRGC's transit list. Trump's post makes this worse: if the US withdraws, Europe has no patron for a reopening operation. EUR earners with energy-intensive operations should continue accelerating input cost hedges. For portfolio companies sourcing primary aluminium or petrochemicals from the Gulf, the EGA damage in Abu Dhabi is still not quantified for repair timeline; begin qualifying Mediterranean or North American alternative suppliers now.

GBP earners

GBP/USD at 1.321 and under pressure. Trump's public naming of the UK as a Hormuz free-rider is a political risk that sits outside normal macro analysis. If the US proceeds to hand Hormuz reopening to allies, the UK faces a choice between participating in a naval operation Starmer has explicitly ruled out and accepting permanently higher energy import costs. Neither is priced. GBP earners should tighten hedges: move stop-losses on existing GBP/USD positions to 1.315 and consider extending hedge tenors to six months. The BoE's June decision is now more consequential than it was yesterday.

6 April energy-strike deadline: Trump's threat to destroy Iranian energy infrastructure if Hormuz is not reopened. Six days remain. The single most important binary event on the calendar.

Allied response to Trump's 'go get your own oil': whether the UK, EU, or Japan issue formal responses. Any indication that allies are exploring a non-US naval escort for Hormuz, or any decision not to, will determine whether the post-war energy architecture includes or excludes Western access to Gulf supply.

Pakistan-Beijing track: Pakistan's deputy PM is meeting China's Wang Yi. Whether this produces a joint mediation proposal or a Chinese diplomatic entry into the process would change the calculus materially.

Iran's missile inventory signal: the rate decline from 90 to 10-15 per day is either exhaustion or conservation. Watch for any single-day spike back above 30, which would indicate conservation and a deliberate escalatory choice.

NATO Article 5 pressure: four Iranian missiles have now required NATO intercepts over Turkey. Watch for any formal Turkish invocation or deliberate non-invocation; both are significant.

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