March 15, 2023

It’s World War One all over again.

The current situation on the Ukrainian front lines is often compared to the Western front of World War One. The parallels are indeed very strong, to the point where hard won lessons of 1915 reappear in current Russian doctrine.

I was reading this thread on a Russian combat manual and I kept thinking of the same rules appearing in old war memoirs and diaries. Sometimes they seem to be lifted straight from the pages of First World War military manuals.

NOTE: This is not an exhaustive comparison, just a few highlights that struck me as interesting.

I suspect that the Russians have learned these lessons anew, but they’re certainly not the first. Read on for a selection of correlations with World War One manuals.

The Real Role of Artillery Fires in an Assault

• The pause between the assault and artillery fire on fortified positions should be no longer than one minute

Part of the lesson here is actually really profound. There are two methods of using artillery against fortifications: destructive, and neutralising.

Destructive fires are not very effective against well entrenched positions. The fires have to hit the right targets precisely, and Russian artillery is just not that accurate.

Neutralising fires are not intended to destroy the enemy, but rather to keep them inside their bunkers. Defenders sheltering from artillery are generally unable to resist the advancing assault. The trick is to ensure that the artillery lifts only when the assault arrives, not before.

The time between the artillery lifting and the assault arriving can be exploited by the defenders to man their positions. The longer the gap, the more opportunity the defenders have to… well, defend.

As a lessons learned document from 1916 says:

‘Experience has shown that it is far better to risk a few casualties from an occasional short round from our own artillery than to suffer the many casualties which occur when the bombardment is not closely followed up.’ 1

Fool Me Once, …

• Occupying abandoned trenches is prohibited because they may have been booby-trapped or could have been prepared as targets for artillery strikes.

Here’s that tactic used in the first Chechen war during the defense of Bahmut in 1995.

Knowing that they would have to displace, and hoping to suck the Russians into their abandoned positions, the [Chechen] unit mined their own trenches with the antitank mines, linked together for remote detonation. Under intense fire, but as planned, the Chechens then withdrew to secondary trenches. Russian infantry pursuing the retreating Chechen group jumped into the abandoned trench line and began to consolidate the newly captured position. The Chechen unit detonated the mines from their secondary trenches and the whole position was destroyed, killing all the Russians occupying the trench. With its infantry gone, the Russian armor withdrew under fire. 2

Attack First, Aid Later

• Assaulters cannot evacuate the wounded themselves; they must relay the wounded's coordinates to the evacuation team.

I think there are multiple reasons for this rule. Firstly to maintain the initiative. The attack could stall out and reach culmination before achieving its objectives if the attacking force depletes at 2-3 men per 1 casualty. Secondly, to limit opportunities for shirking and avoiding combat.

Here’s an example of the latter in 1914 when a British battalion begins receiving fire while advancing towards German positions.

It was not long before the Germans opened [fire] on the 57th [battalion, 1st Middlesex Regiment], whereupon they all lay down and, where possible, took cover and the advance ceased. After an interval a few slightly wounded men approached, each attended by two or three solicitous friends, one carrying his rifle, another his water-bottle, and so on. These willing helpers were gently pushed back into the fray. 3

Russian hierarchical command problems

There are reports of Russian units conducting the same failed attack repeatedly. As if the commanders have no real idea of the actual conditions and keep issuing the same orders.

Obviously it is better to have decisions made at the correct scope. That is, someone on the front lines will have better understanding of the tactical realities and should be able to control the tactical decisions. More senior commanders should deal with operational and strategic issues. When commanders with no knowledge or understanding of the real conditions make tactical decisions, it can be a disaster.

This is a description of an assault against German lines in September 1915. It begins just before zero-hour.

Our artillery treated the German front line with rapid fire; the shooting was good—but the garrison had been withdrawn to the support line. At the same time the Special Gas Company opened the cocks of the cylinders. The unfavourable wind had been reported early to the Brigadier, and he applied to have the gas countermanded—without avail. What wind there was caused it to drift along the line from right to left and to fall back into the trench. Men in the front line got mouthfuls of it, and some became panicky. Gas helmets were adjusted. While the wearers were being stifled in them, the German artillery opened on the crowded trench with well-aimed fire which caused casualties. 4

Commanders close to the action are overruled by officers far to the rear. A fundamental problem with the Russian army has been the lack of command in the lower echelons.

The Perils of Cheating During Rapid Mobilisation

Britains rapid mobilisation in 1914 was partially driven by the creation of “Pals Battalions,” units that all drawn from the same neighbourhoods, workplace, school, football club, and so on. It was a useful recruiting tactic and created a shortcut to unit cohesion. The downside was less obvious.

Entire streets would learn at the same time that all their men were slaughtered. Schools would have their graduating class destroyed in an afternoon. It was a terrible blow to the people at home.

Parthian Shots

I find it amazing how the same lessons that were learned in the First World War remain relevant over a hundred years later. Modern wars without air superiority or massive tank support are the most brutish form of industrial war.