September 18, 2024

Hezbollah Hacked? Pager Panic!

Hezbollah Hacked? Pager Panic!

A supplement post to collect information on the attack targeting Hezbollah's pagers. Obviously, this is still a developing story, so the information is bound to change; however, the broad outlines appear to be established.

Today, September 17, thousands of pagers used by Hezbollah operatives exploded, killing at least 10 people and injuring 2,800. There is a heated discussion about whether this was a remote cyber attack using the battery as an improvised explosive device, or whether the pagers were interdicted and sabotaged before delivery to Hezbollah.

I believe that the attack was conducted with explosives inserted into the pagers and triggered via the network.

A lithium fire is highly unlikely. Lithium explodes slowly and burns with a lot of fire. The videos of explosions show very rapid detonations with no fire. Videos and pictures of damaged furniture show holes, but little to no fire damage.

The explosions look like a high explosive, not a lithium battery fire.

Compare:

Further points against the lithium battery hypothesis include:

1. Thousands of simultaneous explosions. If the explosion was caused purely by manipulating the battery, there would be high variance in the timing.

2. The injuries are severe, but crucially they are not burns as one would expect from contact with a lithium fire.

3. Videos show people receiving a page and checking it just before the explosion, far too rapid a sequence of events for a lithium battery fire.

4. In 2013, Charlie Miller attempted to make a laptop battery explode via cyber methods. He was unable to get it to self-immolate.

5. Reports say that there were three types of pager. Multiple types of devices would make it even harder to create a reliable remote controlled explosion (RCE).

The preponderance of evidence suggests that the attack vector was an explosive, not a lithium battery.

There are reports suggesting how the attack was carried out. A supply of pagers from an Iranian supplier was interdicted and modified.

This reporter says the modification was the addition of 20 grams of high explosive.

For more on how Hezbollah uses pagers and dumb phones for communication, a good case study from 2012 provides insight. Here is the relevant passage:

In the event a meeting was necessary, Yaacoub would receive a text message. A text about the weather meant to go to the Finikoudes promenade in Larnaca that day at 6 PM. If no one showed up, Yaacoub was to return the following day at 2:00 PM, and then again the next day at 10:30 AM.

The paper is here:

Hizb Allah Resurrected: The Party of God’s Return to Tradecraft – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point

During the past few years, Lebanese Hizb Allah’s global operations increased markedly, but until recently its efforts yielded few successes. In July 2012, however, Hizb Allah operatives bombed a busload of Israeli tourists in Burgas, Bulgaria, killing five Israelis and a Bulgarian bus driver.[1] Yet what may prove no less significant than this operational success … Continued