One reason I am glad to be alive in the 21st century is that I feel a high level of public skepticism around objectivity. I mean objectivity as in scientific objectivity—the idea that we can make statements about metaphysical truth based on logic and observations of the world. I do not mean to denounce the role of science—I'm a scientist and not at existential odds with myself; I just mean to acknowledge that, dang, it is a relief to acknowledge that metaphysical truth can't be accessed.
Empirical science always deals with rectifying the discrepancies between models of the world and what is actually found, whether by incomplete models or sampling (map-territory relationship issues), lack of falsifiability in a model (ala Copernicanism), and the compounding effects of assumptions and bias in the schema, whether implicit or explicit. (My boss recently said "any calibration is interpretation" with regards to data processing.)
Theoretical sciences (i.e. mathematics) also fall victim to the final item above, despite people often assuming that math is some kind of system not invented by humans. Mathematics is dictated by the language and forms we use to manipulate its entities, all of which are subject to the same limits of interpretation and context of language. I'm very interested in what acknowledging such could do to change and improve the nature of mathematics. We're also Post-Gödel, so the hope for some constructed airtight system of logic is shot. Delightfully, we trudge onwards. I articulated more nuanced thoughts on the role and interpretation of mathematics in an essay a few years ago, "Math & Mysticism."
I am what you'd call an instrumentalist—I believe in the ability to distinguishing good science mostly in terms of how much the work is as consistent and replicable as possible while the narrative the science proposes is graspable, communicable, and follows reasonable logics. Truth, today, is the thing we see from the most possible angles, that which corroborates itself most clearly.
I highly recommend "MOVING TOWARDS A FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY OF MATHEMATICS."
Wrong,
Lukas
Empirical science always deals with rectifying the discrepancies between models of the world and what is actually found, whether by incomplete models or sampling (map-territory relationship issues), lack of falsifiability in a model (ala Copernicanism), and the compounding effects of assumptions and bias in the schema, whether implicit or explicit. (My boss recently said "any calibration is interpretation" with regards to data processing.)
Theoretical sciences (i.e. mathematics) also fall victim to the final item above, despite people often assuming that math is some kind of system not invented by humans. Mathematics is dictated by the language and forms we use to manipulate its entities, all of which are subject to the same limits of interpretation and context of language. I'm very interested in what acknowledging such could do to change and improve the nature of mathematics. We're also Post-Gödel, so the hope for some constructed airtight system of logic is shot. Delightfully, we trudge onwards. I articulated more nuanced thoughts on the role and interpretation of mathematics in an essay a few years ago, "Math & Mysticism."
I am what you'd call an instrumentalist—I believe in the ability to distinguishing good science mostly in terms of how much the work is as consistent and replicable as possible while the narrative the science proposes is graspable, communicable, and follows reasonable logics. Truth, today, is the thing we see from the most possible angles, that which corroborates itself most clearly.
I highly recommend "MOVING TOWARDS A FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY OF MATHEMATICS."
Wrong,
Lukas