October 30, 2023

Making Sense of Embodiment Part Three – Mind

As the discussion of biological sex in terms of an Homoeostatic Property Cluster should have made clear, biological sex is not an empirical concept. Rather, it is an interpretitive concept, in the sense that the ascription of sex is the result of an interpretation of observed properties.

The moment we speak of interpretation, however, we are no longer moving in the realm of matter (the "logical space of natural laws", to use Wilfrid Sellars' term), but in the realm of the spirit (or the of the mind (or the "logical space of reasons"). The mode of interpretation and sense-making is, in this context, the way in which human orientation in the world takes place. Things, and the contexts in which things stand, are not simply given to us, but we have to understand them, put them into rational relations with each other, and ultimately give them meaning. The transition of bodies that have homeostatically clustered properties to a biological sex is already an act of understanding through the bestowal of meaning: "This body has homeostatically clustered properties from that group, and that means it is a male/female body."1 To put it a bit provocatively: For reproduction there is no need for sexes, but only for bodies with corresponding property clusters.

Of course, these acts of interpretation do not stop at the fact that a particular group of properties are summarized under a single designation. I do not speak only of of interpretation, but of meaning-making by means of interpretation. Something acquires meaning by being interpreted in a way through which it plays a certain role with regard to the way in which we as human beings relate to ourselves as human beings. This interpretation of meaning concerns all aspects of our existence and thus also the facts of our embodied existence. These facts are never simply given, but we are always already integrated into a community that presents these facts to us in a way that they have a specific meaning.

To use a (hopefully) innocuous example: almost all living beings are born, so that one can talk here about a "simple biological fact". But we humans are the only known living beings who celebrate their birthdays with others. The practice of celebrating birthdays is one way to give meaning to the simple biological fact that we are born. Birth is no longer a natural event like the falling of leaves in autumn, but an episode in in the biography of a person - trivially in the biography of the person celebrating the birthday, but also in the biography of other persons, such as parents and other relatives. It is the same with the facts of our embodied existence, which are interpreted as biological sex. They have to be interpreted in a way that they have a specific meaning, so that they can be placed in the biography of the individual. In this respect the determination of gender identity is a hermeneutics of the body.

It is eminently important to understand that this interpretation of meaning does not take place from a neutral position, so that the simple facts of embodied existence would initially be given uninterpreted "as they are" and any meaning could be ascribed to them in a radically free act. Rather, we are always already part of a community, in which concrete practices of interpreting meaning are established, which we first adopt. These initially and adopted practices of meaning interpretation are usually called "tradition". We experience our embodied existence in a way that is always already interpreted. Thus we learn, for example, that pain and illness are a reason to care, birthdays and especially old age are a reason to celebrate. birthdays and especially old age are a reason to celebrate, and that our lives are divided into certain phases within which certain developmental steps are expected.

Thus, we are presented with certain ways of interpreting the meaning of our embodied existence. Since interpretation of meaning means that something plays a role for one's own self-understanding and one's own biography, the established practice of interpretation of meaning determines certain ways in which the aspects of our embodied existence that are subsumed under the category of "gender" play a role. This can range from relatively trivial ways of interpreting these aspects (such as, that certain names can only be considered for persons with certain bodies), up to extreme forms such as the restriction of reproductive self-determination. The reasons and motives for certain interpretations, as well as the way in which they are reproduced and maintained, can be manifold. It is hard to deny that they often enough serve the protection of power interests. But in so far as they are always ways of interpretation, they can be also be different, and it is an open question how we should interpret our embodied existence, and whether a certain way of interpretation is a good one.

In fact, it is possible to distinguish between better and worse ways of interpretation: the debate about gender equality can be understood precisely as a debate between different ways of interpretation. The question of the criteria by which one mode of interpretation can be shown to be better or worse than another, in turn, presupposes an interpretation. The naturalization of a certain interpretation is itself a way in which this interpretation is reproduced and immunizes itself against criticism and revision. In any case, it is crucial that there is no conception of our embodied existence independent of any interpretation.

So, first there is a historically developed and more or less widely accepted way in which we relate to the facts of our embodied existence so that they acquire meaning and become part of our self-understanding. These modes of interpretation can be expressed in terms of "for us" sentences: "Having this body means for us that you are talked about with certain pronouns/your parents can give you one from this selection of names but not from that/this appearance is eligible for you but not that/you can desire these bodies but not those...". The community, in which we are inevitably involved, has thus an established practice to put itself into a certain relation to the human embodied existence and passes this on to us, so that we put ourselves into a corresponding relation to our own embodied existence.

It is undeniable that there are cases in which this mode of interpretation, which is lived and adopted, and the normative expectations associated with it do not correspond with the individual self-experience. It would be obvious to describe these cases in such a way that the communal interpretation of embodied existence is contrasted with a substantively different self-interpretation. However, it seems to me that this is an oversimplified account of these situations. What this does not address, in fact, is the fact that individuals must not only relate to their own self-experience in an appropriate way so that their embodied existence can be integrated into their personhood in a way that suits them. For they remain, after all, part of a community which, for its part, places itself in a relationship to the embodied existence of the person in question, and that means that they themselves must place themselves in a relationship to this relationship. This is already because they have taken over the interpretation exemplified by the community in the first place.

That is, the individual psychological dimension of gender identity cannot simply be captured in analogy to the social dimension in "for me" sentences. It seems more appropriate to express it in "for us and for me" sentences: "Having this body means for us..., and for me it means...". Even persons who adopt the exemplified interpretation of their embodied existence for themselves must integrate this interpretation into their personal biography so that it plays an appropriate role with regard to their very personal self-experience. A person who declares that they are interpreted as male by their community, but has concluded that they cannot adopt this interpretation for themselves, is after all still assigning a role to this interpretation in their own biography.2 Now, since no two biographies and self-experiences are completely the same, there will always be certain discrepancies between the "for us" and the "for me".

If, on the level of individual psychology, relating oneself to one's own embodied existence necessarily implies that the persons concerned relate themselves to the way the community relates to its embodied existence, then this means that the rejection of the mode of interpretation that is lived out also presupposes a relationship to it. This is important insofar as the resources of interpretation of meaning from which this rejection is fed - we remember: every way of relating to one's own embodied existence is an act of interpretation of meaning - must also be provided by the community.

Thus, when a person says "Having this body does mean... to us, but to me it means..." then on the one hand this statement refers to a given mode of interpretation, and on the other hand it must justify itself as a possible mode of interpretation, and this can only be done by referring to resources shared by both the community and the person rejecting the mode of interpretation exemplified.3 This shows once again that the understanding of possible ways of interpretation does not take place from a neutral point of view, from which the facts are presented uninterpreted, but from within a way of life that is always already shared.